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Abstract. We introduce and study a model of an interacting population of agents who collaborate in groups
which compete for limited resources. Groups are formed by random matching agents and their worth is
determined by the sum of the efforts deployed by agents in group formation. Agents, on their side, have to
share their effort between contributing to their group’s chances to outcompete other groups and resource
sharing among partners, when the group is successful. A simple implementation of this strategic interaction
gives rise to static and evolutionary properties with a very rich phenomenology. A robust emerging feature
is the separation of the population between agents who invest mainly in the success of their group and
agents who concentrate in getting the largest share of their group’s profits.
PACS. 89.65.-s Social and economic systems – 02.50.Le Decision theory and game theory
1 Introduction
The collective behavior of a population of interacting in-
dividuals often exhibits surprising properties, which can
hardly be anticipated on the basis of the micro-economic
interaction. Game theory provides a unified background
for analyzing the outcomes of strategic interactions among
individuals rationally pursuing their self-interest[1]. Its pre-
dictions, however, are often contradicted by empirical and
experimental research already in simple cases such as the
prisoner’s dilemma or the ultimatum game [2,3,4]. This
casts even more serious doubts on its validity in cases
where individuals face a more complex strategic problem,
involving a large number of other agents, uncertainty and
limited information. On the other hand, many collective
phenomena in the natural sciences owe their peculiarity
to laws of statistical nature rather than to their specific
microscopic details. This suggests that an approach simi-
lar to that of statistical physics can complement the game
theoretic approach and highlight the role of statistical laws
in collective socio-economic phenomena. Much work has
been done along these lines on models of socio-dynamics[5]
and on simple models of evolutionary dynamics [6,8]. For
example, in spite of the doom predictions of game the-
ory on the inevitability of defective behavior in contexts
such as the prisoners dilemma, a different approach has
shown that cooperative behavior and altruism can indeed
be sustained in a complex interactive environment, in sev-
eral ways [7].
Here we pursue this approach in a case where com-
petition and the needs to cooperate are intertwined in
the strategic interaction. Our setup is one where agents
have to match in small groups, which compete for lim-
ited resources. Agents in those groups which succeed in
this competition face the additional problem of sharing
the profits among themselves. Agents have to decide how
to divide their effort in either contributing to the success
of their group or, when their group is successful, in secur-
ing the largest share of the group’s profit for themselves.
A concrete example of this is public funding of academic
research, for which empirical analyses start to appear [9].
Individual researchers form networks which submit pro-
posals for a specific call in their field. Only the best pro-
posals get accepted. Once a particular proposal is accepted
the funds (and the workload) are shared among the net-
work partners. Each researcher may decide to either com-
mit a large effort to the preparation of projects, which
implies little effort in the negotiation stage if the project
is approved, or to commit a limited effort, thus ensuring a
larger profit when funds are to be divided but also making
the whole project weaker. This set up combines the incen-
tives to free ride inside the group with the necessity of
cooperating with group members in order to out-compete
other groups. The former is akin to incentives to defection
in prisoner’s dilemma or ultimatum games, whereas the
latter is typical of competitive behavior in markets, which
is often conducive to efficient outcomes (optimal resource
allocation). Does the tension between these two elements
leads to virtuous or collusive behavior? This is the key
issue we address here.
We shall focus on a model which offers a simple real-
ization of the generic setup discussed above. This will not
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allow us to derive a general answer to the question above,
but rather illustrates the complexity, i.e. the richness of
behaviors, which lies behind it. Still, by extending our ba-
sic model in several directions, we shall be able to argue
that our results are quite robust with respect to simple
modifications of the model.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we in-
troduce two versions of a simple model and discuss their
behavior when agents have fixed strategies. The rest of the
paper is focused on the second version of the model (two-
stage game). The constraint of fixed strategies is lifted in
Sec. 3, where the complicated phenomenology induced by
imperfect imitation is described. The possibility for agents
to mutate (i.e. to adopt a totally new strategy) is intro-
duced and studied in Sec. 4. The effects of the variation of
some features of the model are described in Sec. 5. Finally
Sec. 6 presents some conclusions.
2 The model
Let us first introduce an extremely simple model (possibly
the simplest) that describes the problem we are interested
in. Simple considerations about its phenomenology lead
to the formulation of a slightly more complicated model,
that will be investigated in the rest of the paper.
We consider the cooperation of N agents to develop a
scientific project and the subsequent negotiation stage to
share the awarded grant1. Each project involves Np = 2
partners. At each time step every agent participates to one
and only one project. There are hence P = N/Np = N/2
projects. Each agent is endowed at each time step with a
total amount of effort equal to 1 that he has to divide in
two parts:
– A fraction 0 ≤ Ei ≤ 1 is used for the development of
the project.
– A fraction 1−Ei is used for the negotiation process to
share the grant awarded to the project.
At each time step agents are paired randomly and the
resulting projects are ranked depending on their quality,
measured by Ep, the sum of the energies devoted by par-
ticipants to its development. Ep will then be smaller than
2 (smaller than Np in the general case). The P0 projects
with highest Ep are financed with one unit of payoff. Oth-
ers are not financed, i.e. they do not get any payoff. The
threshold energy Es is the value of Ep of the last project
financed. In the case that several projects have the same
energy equal to Es a random selection among them is
performed. Unless specified otherwise we will always take
P0 = P/2.
Participants to successful projects negotiate then the
division of the grant awarded. The assumption is that the
share they receive is proportional to effort they have not
spent in the development of the project, that is
1− Ei
2− Ep
, Ep =
∑
j∈p
Ej , (1)
1 N is chosen such that N/Np and P/P0 are integers
where the sum over j ∈ p includes all participants to the
project p. It is clear that there are (at least in principle)
opposite drives for each agent: is it better to maximize
the probability of success of the project (taking Ei large)
or the share obtained if the project is successful (taking
Ei small)? As we shall see, much depends on the inter-
temporal structure of the game.
2.1 One stage game
It is relatively easy to understand that if each round is
considered independently then the best strategy of agents
is to devote all their efforts to proposing good projects if
we consider the usual assumptions of Game Theory about
rationality of agents.
In order to see this, let us observe that the outcome
of the game for an agent with strategy E, and in particu-
lar his expected payoff π(E) depends on the distribution
f(E) of the energies of all the others. Assuming such dis-
tribution to be fixed, it is easy to derive exactly, in the
N = ∞ limit, the threshold effort Es, i.e. the minimal
effort for a project to be financed, and using such a value,
the probability P#(E) for a single agent to be financed.
In turn, this allows to compute the payoff π(E).
Without entering into details, it is clear that if the
threshold effort Es is larger than 1, agents with effort
E < Es − 1 have no chance to participate to a successful
project, hence their success probability and expected pay-
off will be strictly zero. On the other hand, if Es < 1,
“zealous” agents with E > Es will always have their
projects approved, independently on the effort of their
partner. Similar arguments suggest that, for a generic dis-
tribution f(E), the maximum expected payoff occurs for
intermediate values E¯ of the effort: a careful balance be-
tween work and negotiation is better than the extreme
strategies E = 0 and E = 1. Indeed the former will too
often fail to have their project approved whereas the latter
will derive very little benefits from the projects they take
part in. If there is a best strategy E¯, then all agents will
adopt it, suggesting that f(E) should be sharply peaked
around E¯. In this situation, it is clear that agents having a
slightly larger value of the effort E = E¯ + ζ (with ζ small
enough) will have a larger chance of getting the project
through without paying too much in the sharing phase,
unless E¯ = 1. Therefore, the situation with all agents
choosing strategy E = 1 is the unique Nash Equilibrium of
the game. In other words, if agents can modify their strate-
gies according to a sensible evolutionary dynamics [6] they
will converge to this virtuous asymptotic state.
This strategy is an Evolutionary Stable State: if every-
one has E = 1, that is also the best strategy and no other
strategy can invade it. It is also, in practice, an invading
strategy itself, as in Ref. [10], if we extend in a reasonable
way the concept to our game: any possible starting condi-
tion will tend toward this state. In the one-stage setting,
agents are then expected to converge to a simple symmet-
ric equilibrium. Numerical simulations confirm this expec-
tation.
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Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the division of the total
effort of an agent in the two stages game.
2.2 Two stages game
One unsatisfactory aspect of the discussion above is that
agents who are not financed stay idle and waste the effort
1 − E they intended to spend in the negotiation process.
This might not be realistic in many contexts. For this rea-
son, we shall now move to a modified model based on
the idea that an agent that is not busy with an accepted
project will use all his effort in preparing the next one.
More in detail, the duration of a project spans now two
temporal units, as in overlapping generation models [11]:
projects which are “prepared” in time step t are “run” at
time t + 1. So at each time there is a batch of projects
which agents prepare for the next period, and the previ-
ous batch of projects the best of which are operational.
From the agents’ viewpoint, each has to share his unit
of effort between preparing new projects and sharing the
profits, if they are engaged in successful ones (Fig. 1). The
key difference with the model above is that agents whose
projects were not financed in the previous step are not
involved in any negotiation, so they can use their whole
effort endowment for the preparation of the next project
(this is somehow similar to the War of Attrition game with
implicit time cost as in Ref. [12], where the cost of waiting
is just the inability to join other games). Therefore the ef-
fort Eeffi available to an agent for working at time t + 1
is equal to Ei or 1 depending on whether at time t his
project was financed or not.
It is immediately clear that, at odds with what oc-
curred in the one-stage game, no value of E is too low
for an agent to enter financed projects, because the unit
effort available to an agent after a failure gives him good
chances of being successful at the next step. This consider-
ation intuitively leads to the expectation that there will be
basically two potentially favorable strategies: either work
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Fig. 2. Behavior of the success probability P#i and of the
payoff pii for the agent i (following strategy Ei) for a fixed
effort distribution f(E) = 1; the blue lines are the expected
values (as computed in the Appendix), the green vertical lines
denote Es − 1.
always hard, have many financed projects and yield dur-
ing the sharing process (finite E) or work hard only every
second project, have only half of the projects financed but
get as much as you can out of these (vanishing E).
Indeed, if the effort distribution function f(E) is fixed,
the expected payoff π(E) has two peaks, as shown in Fig. 2
for a representative example.
For E > Es − 1 agents have a finite chance of being
financed even if they have been financed the time before.
For E < Es−1 instead, agents can participate to a success-
ful project only when their effective effort is 1, i.e. they
have not been financed immediately before. As a conse-
quence P#(E) ≤ 1/2. In this class there is no advantage
in having effort E larger than zero, because the probabil-
ity of being financed is independent of E and E > 0 is
not beneficial in the grant division stage: this explains the
relative maximum of the payoff for E = 0. It turns out
that very generally the same kind of phenomenon occurs
also for E > Es − 1 so that the payoff exhibits a second
maximum for E = Es − 1. Which of the two maxima is
highest depends on the detailed form of f(E).
A semi-analytical computation of the expected payoff
for the two-stage model is possible but non particularly
insightful. Hence we shall skip it and move to the dynam-
ics. In the appendix a numerical algorithm to compute the
expected payoff and success probability is reported.
3 Imitation dynamics
With the goal of describing in a more realistic way a sys-
tem of agents competing and collaborating for obtaining
and sharing grants, we now add to the model an evolu-
tionary dynamics, driven by imitation. With probability
rE per unit time an agent has the possibility to copy the
strategy of another randomly chosen agent, if the latter
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Fig. 3. Temporal evolution of the threshold effort Es(t) for a
system of N = 10000 agents and imitation rate rE = 0.04. The
initial form of the effort distribution is f(E) = 1. The vertical
lines help to distinguish the four different regimes.
has higher cumulated payoff. The imitation is imperfect,
i.e. the new effort of the imitating agent has a small ran-
dom contribution between −ǫ and ǫ.
Numerical simulations show that in this case the be-
havior of the system is quite rich. The temporal behavior
of the threshold effort Es (Fig. 3) shows clear signatures of
four well distinct temporal regimes, that reflect different
shapes of the effort distribution f(E).
1. Starting from any initial effort distribution f(E), two
narrow peaks are formed, one for E ≈ 0 and the other
at a value η of the effort E.
2. The two peaks evolve and compete, until the peak in
η disappears.
3. The remaining peak drifts towards high values of E.
4. It eventually enters a sort of stationary state with in-
termittent oscillations about a large value of E.
This phenomenology occurs for any value of rE > 0,
provided it is much smaller than 1, otherwise the system
becomes completely random. The dependence on the ini-
tial shape of f(E) is weak and does not change qualita-
tively the picture. We now describe in more detail the four
regimes.
3.1 Initial regime: formation of two peaks
As intuitively expected from the static version of the model,
agents will tend to imitate other agents with energies cor-
responding to the payoff maxima (see Fig. 2). This quickly
leads to the collapse of the distribution function f(E) in
two peaks, one around 0 and the other around a finite
value η not far from the initial value of Es − 1 (see the
first four panels of Fig. 4). At the same time, since the ef-
fort distribution varies, Es slowly changes in time (Fig. 3).
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Fig. 5. Behavior of the threshold energy Es, the amplitude ρ0
of the peak in E = 0 and the position η of the other peak, as
a function of time in the first and second regime for a system
with parameters rE = 0.04 and N = 10000. The horizontal
lines are for the values ρ0 = 7/12 and η = 6/13 (derived in the
Appendix), that separate different regimes.
3.2 First intermediate regime: competition of the two
peaks
When there are two peaks the dynamics can be monitored
by two time-dependent quantities:
– η(t): the average position of the second peak (the first
is always around E = 0).
– ρ0(t) the fraction of agents belonging to the first peak
(obviously ρη = 1− ρ0).
Numerically, one observes that the peak in η tends to
move towards the right (and upward in Fig. 3), while si-
multaneously its total population decreases (i.e. ρ0 grows).
This is evident from Fig. 4, where the evolution of the
effort distribution f(E) is represented, and from Fig. 5,
where Es, ρ0 and η are reported as a function of time.
The drift of the second peak towards larger energies is
easily understood qualitatively. The fundamental obser-
vation is that the threshold effort Es(t) falls within the
peak in η, which has a width of the order of ǫ. As a con-
sequence, agents with energies in the left part of the peak
will be less financed than those in the right part and then
will tend to imitate them. The peak position slowly drifts
towards right because of the struggle of agents to work
just a little bit more than their colleagues.
The dynamics of ρ0(t) can be understood by mak-
ing use of the simplifying assumption that the peaks are
Dirac-δ functions. Under such assumption one can com-
pute the expected payoff of agents in the two peaks as a
function of ρ0 and η (Fig. 6). See the appendix for details
about the derivation.
For small η < 2/7 ≈ 0.286 . . . the strategy E = η is
more convenient than E = 0 for any value of ρ0: agents in
η will be imitated and ρ0 decreases.
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Fig. 4. Histograms of the effort distribution f(E) during the first two regimes. The initial f(E) is uniform, rE = 0.04 and
N = 10000. The formation of the two peaks is followed by their competition leading to the disappearance of the peak in E ≈ η.
For 2/7 < η < 6/13 there are two values of ρ0 for
which the payoff of the two peaks is the same. 2 The dy-
namics of ρ0(t) is much faster than the evolution of η(t),
as a detailed evaluation brings out that the rate of change
η˙ is smaller than ρ˙ by a factor of the order of ǫ. As a conse-
quence, for any η, ρ0(t) assumes the stable “equilibrium”
value corresponding to the leftmost point where the two
payoffs are the same. The temporal evolution of ρ0(η) is
then enslaved by the evolution of η(t).
Finally, for η > 6/13, the payoff of agents in zero is al-
ways larger than the payoff of agents in η. Therefore when
this critical value is reached (corresponding to ρ0 = 7/12)
an abrupt change occurs: the threshold effort suddenly
moves towards 1, the relative balance between the two
peaks breaks down and rapidly the peak in η disappears.
Notice that the passage from Es of the order 1 + η to
a value close to 1 is a rather intermittent process (Fig. 5):
due to fluctuations associated with the random pairing of
agents and the finiteness of N , for some time the threshold
2 The asymptotic value of η is actually larger than 6/13,
probably due to the effect of the finite width of the two peaks.
energy bounces back and forth between the two values
before setting to a value close to 1.
3.3 Second intermediate regime: single peak drifting
Once a single peak is present, its position drifts towards
larger effort values (Fig. 3) for reasons perfectly analogu-
ous to what happened before to the peak in η: agents in
the right part of the peak tend to be more successful and
hence be imitated. In this “ideal” regime agents constantly
improve themselves by devoting more and more effort to
projects and less and less to the negotiation stage.
3.4 Asymptotic regime: strong intermittent oscillations
Also the ideal stage is doomed to end. This happens when
the width of the peak ∆E∗ becomes comparable to 1−E∗,
the distance from 1 of the peak position E∗. In such a case,
a strategy in the extreme left tail of the peak becomes
convenient, because the reduced chance of being financed
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Fig. 6. Behavior of the payoff difference pi(0)− pi(η) between
an agent with effort E = 0 and one with effort E = η as a
function of ρ0 for different values of η. The arrows indicate the
direction of the dynamical evolution.
is compensated by a strong advantage in the grant divi-
sion. This leads to the formation of a secondary peak for
E ≈ E∗ −∆E∗. At this point a competition between two
peaks similar to the one of the First intermediate stage
takes place, leading to a succession of cycles where the
rightmost peak disappears, the remaining drifts towards
1 and then splits again in two peaks.
4 The role of mutations
We now consider the effect induced by the possibility of
agents to mutate, i.e. to adopt a new strategy between
E = 0 and E = 1 in a completely random way. The frac-
tion of mutating agents per time step rM is taken to be
much smaller than the imitation rate rE , so that muta-
tions do not completely change the general dynamics ex-
cept for the possibility of agents to explore the whole space
of strategies. In other words, they make the dynamics in-
novative, still preserving monotonicity with respect to the
payoff [1].
While the general picture remains the same, with the
competition between two types of strategies, mutations
modify the detailed phenomenology. In particular they
make states with a single peak always unstable, thus pre-
venting stages 3 and 4 of the mutationless case (second
intermediate and asymptotic regimes) to be reached. Af-
ter the initial formation of two peaks, the competition
between them leads, as before, to growth of the peak in 0
and to the fast decay of the one in η. At this point it is
necessary to distinguish between two possible cases.
If rM is extremely small with respect to rE (see below
for details) mutated agents probe all possible effort values
between 0 and η and one of them gives rise to a new peak
that rapidly overcomes the others and starts drifting right.
Once it goes beyond η = 2/7, as it can be seen from Fig. 6,
the strategy E = 0 becomes again advantageous against
agents in η (with ρ0 = 0). A peak in zero starts to grow,
while η grows further, bringing the system back to the
first intermediate regime. The system enters therefore in a
cycle with two peaks that cyclically collapse and reappear.
(Fig. 7).
For larger values of rM (but still rM ≪ rE) instead, the
state with one peak in 0 and one in 0.5 becomes essentially
evolutionary stable (Fig. 8). The populations of the two
peaks will be around the critical values ρ0 = 7/12, ρη =
5/12. Depending on small variations of such populations,
and on the creation of some agents with energies between
them, Es will then fluctuate intermittently between 1 to
1.5
By considering different system sizes it turns out that
the boundary between these two behaviors goes to a finite
limit (of the order of rM/rE ≈ 10
−2) when N diverges.
5 Robustness of the phenomenology
What happens if some of the assumptions underlying the
model are changed? In order to investigate the robust-
ness of the phenomenology presented above, we consider
several modifications applied to the model with both im-
perfect imitation and enough mutations to generate a sta-
tionary state with two peaks in equilibrium.
If the fraction of profits received by an agent, Eq. (1)
is taken proportional to (1−E)α, with α > 0, simulations
show that no qualitative change occurs with respect to the
case α = 1, studied above.
Another possibility is to introduce some stochasticity
in the probability to be approved. So far the probability
for a project of total effort Ep to be financed has a sharp
threshold: P (Ep > Es) = 1, P (Ep < Es) = 0. If we
consider instead a smooth function
P (Ep) =
1
exp [(Ep − Es)/T ] + 1
, (2)
it becomes possible that a project of relatively small value
is financed while a better one (higher Ep) is not. Simula-
tions again show that nothing changes qualitatively in the
global behavior of the system, provided the “temperature”
T is not too high.
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Fig. 7. Temporal evolution of the histogram of the effort distribution f(E) and of the threshold energy Es for a system with
rE = 0.04, N = 10000 and a very small mutation rate rM = 0.0001.
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Fig. 8. Temporal evolution of the histogram of the effort distribution f(E) and of the threshold energy Es for a system with
rE = 0.04, N = 10000 and a small mutation rate rM = 0.001.
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One parameter that turns out instead to affect notice-
ably the results is the fraction Q of approved projects. So
far we have always taken P0 = P/2, i.e. half of the projects
were financed and half of them were not. For generic value
of Q = P0/P projects can be distinguished in three cate-
gories. If both agents taking part to the project were not
financed at the previous step then Ep = 2. This occurs
with probability (1 − Q)2. If one of them was financed
(probability 2Q(1−Q)) then 1 ≤ Ep ≤ 2; else, with prob-
ability Q2, 0 ≤ Ep ≤ 1. After a transient stage, whose
duration may vary with Q, the system settles in a sta-
tionary state. The properties of such state depend on the
value of Q leading to the identification of several different
regimes, reflected in the behavior displayed in Fig. 9.
For Q ≤ 3−
√
5
2
≈ 0.38, since (1−Q)2 > Q all financed
projects have effort Ep = 2, i.e. they involve partners that
have not been financed at the previous step. The proba-
bility of being financed does not depend on E. Hence all
agents converge to the E = 0 strategy: too few financed
projects push agents to laziness and greedy negotiations.
For 3−
√
5
2
< Q <
√
5−1
2
≈ 0.62 the behavior is of the
same type of the case studied so far Q = 1/2, with the
competition of two peaks, one in 0 and the other in E = η,
whose amplitude goes to zero at the boundaries of the
range.
For Q >
√
5−1
2
the situation is more involved. In gen-
eral a single peak is formed rather than two. For Q ≈ 0.7
the peak jumps from an effort close to zero to one larger
than 1/2, because the presence of agents with E > 1/2
reinforces the profitability of such strategies.
It is important to remark that the presence of three
distinct regions is related to the number of participants to
each project Np = 2. For a generic Np there are Np + 1
zones, separated by points where the E = 0 strategy dom-
inates all others. Variations on Np have also other effects,
mainly quantitative: the more partecipants per project,
the less the agents tend to work. The second peak will
move toward 0. Of course when there are too many agents
per project the two peaks eventually become indiscernible.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced a very simple model for
the formation of collaborations in scientific projects and
the ensuing stage where partners negotiate to share the
awarded grants. The model includes only the main fea-
tures of the process. It can therefore be viewed as describ-
ing a generic situation where agents have to collaborate
within a group to compete globally for limited resources
but also negotiate within the group to share the profit
earned together.
In order to identify the most relevant effects and under-
stand their role in the resulting phenomenology we have
kept the description at a very basic level and perfomed
an exploratory investigation, with no claim of considering
any realistic situation. Despite these clear oversimplifica-
tions, the model displays some interesting, if not realistic,
patterns of behavior.
Generically, within the two-stage game, the popula-
tion of agents spontaneously clusters around two differ-
ent strategies. “Hard workers” are characterized by rel-
atively large values of the effort they put in the prepa-
ration of proposals. They tend to maximize the quality
of their projects, so that a large fraction of them is fi-
nanced. Consequently they put less effort in the negoti-
ation stage. “Greedy” agents cluster instead around the
strategy E = 0, implying that they try to maximize their
share when a grant is obtained. To do this they accept
that their proposals are financed less frequently, and work
hard only if this does not decrease their ability to argue
about how to share the profits. Depending on the details
of the model, the two populations are either in equilibrium
or exhibit oscillations, but the existence of two classes of
behavior is a robust feature.
Finally, the study of the dependence on the fraction of
approved projects, shows that a small number of rejected
projects is sufficient to push agents towards a state with
minimum internal competition and large productive effort.
On the other hand, when Q is very small, so that the
time lag between approved projects is large, agents tend to
struggle for the scarce resources when they are available,
instead of committing themselves to productive effort.
These interesting findings clearly call for additional in-
vestigations. In the spirit of going towards more realism,
many possible variations of the model may be devised. One
of the most natural is to consider heterogeneity either in
agents’ intrinsic skills (the total effort available) or in the
composition of projects (number of participants).
A further interesting direction has to do with exten-
sions to interaction structures which are more constrained
and realistic than the random matching assumed here.
Preliminary results show, for agents placed on a square
lattice, interesting spatio-temporal patterns with phase
segregation between a population with E ≈ 0 and E ≈ 1,
if both the ranges of imitation and collaboration are lim-
ited. A natural generalization of this has to do with al-
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lowing agents to select their neighbors depending on past
performance. Preliminary results suggest that both con-
straining the interaction pattern and allowing agents to
selectively choose neighbors generally increases the global
performance of the system, as measured by the threshold
effort Es for a project to be financed. The simultaneous
evolution of the network of connections and of the distri-
bution of agent strategies is another promising direction
to follow. The systematic study of these effects deserves a
systematic study to be discussed elsewhere.
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Appendix
In this appendix we report the derivation of the payoff
curves shown in Fig. 6. This is carried out assuming that
each peak has vanishing width, so that it is mathemati-
cally described by a Dirac’s δ function. We take the first
peak to be in E = 0 and the second in E = η. In this
case the system is fully described by the quantities ρ0− ,
the density of agents with zero effective effort, and η that
sets the effort of the other peak. The superscripts + e −
represent agents that commit in the project an effective
effort equal to 1 or E, respectively.
At each time step the number of agents that does not
receive a grant is half of the total. Hence ρ+ = 1/2 and
from the normalization condition ρ0− + ρη− + ρ+ = 1 one
gets ρη− =
1
2
− ρ0− .
The effort Ep of a project, given by the sum of effective
energies of two randomly selected agents, can be
– 0, with probability ρ2
0−
– η, with probability 2ρ0−(
1
2
− ρ0−)
– 2η, with probability (1
2
− ρ0−)
2
– 1, with probability 2 1
2
ρ0−
– 1 + η, with probability 2 1
2
(1
2
− ρ0−)
– 2, with probability 1
4
Projects with total effort Ep = 2 are always financed.
Which of the other projects gets funded (and hence what
is the threshold effort Es) depends on the value of ρ
−
0 and
η.
For ρ0− ≤ 1/4 the projects with effort Ep = 1+ η and
2 are together more than half of the total number P . As
a consequence Es will be 1 + η. Otherwise, if ρ0− > 1/4,
other projects are funded. For η < 1/2, that is the relevant
case, the remaining projects with higher effort are those
with Ep = 1, i.e. the projects with one partner in state +
and one in state 0−.
The probability to be financed, as a function of the
effective effort Eeff is then, for ρ0− ≤ 1/4
P#(Eeff = 0) = 0 (3)
P#(Eeff = η) =
1
4− 8ρ0−
(4)
P#(Eeff = 1) =
3
4
(5)
In order to compute the expected payoffs one needs to
evaluate, for agents with strategy 0 (η) how many of them
are in effective state 0+ (η+) and how many in state 0−
(η−). This is carried out by assuming that the populations
in state + or− are in equilibrium, i.e. the rate of transition
from − to + [R(− → +)] is equal to the opposite rate
R(+→ −). This is reasonable because these processes are
much quicker than all others, and in particular imitation.
For the strategy E = 0 this yields
R(− → +) = ρ0−(1− P
#(0−)) = ρ0− (6)
R(+→ −) = ρ0+P
#(+) =
3
4
ρ0+ , (7)
so that
ρ0− =
3
7
ρ0 ρ0+ =
4
7
ρ0. (8)
Similarly, for E = µ
R(− → +) = ρη−
3− 8ρ0−
4− 8ρ0−
(9)
R(+→ −) =
3
4
ρη+ , (10)
so that
ρη− =
3− 6ρ0−
6− 14ρ0−
ρη ρη+ =
3− 8ρ0−
6− 14ρ0−
ρη. (11)
From the condition on ρ0− one obtains that ρ0− ≤
1
4
if
ρ0 ≤
7
12
.
We are now in the position to determine the average
expected payoffs π(0) and π(η), by summing, over all pos-
sible pairings, the probability of such pairing times the
associated expected payoff.
π(0) =
21− 8ηρ0
49(2− η)
(12)
π(η) =
98− 84ρ0 + η(−49 + 32ρ
2
0)
196(2− η)(1 − ρ0)
(13)
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The application of the same procedure with the ap-
propriate values for P#(Eeff) gives the expression of the
average payoffs also for ρ0− > 1/4 (ρ0 > 7/12). The be-
havior of the payoff difference π(η) − π(0) in the whole
range of ρ0 is plotted in Fig. 6.
Computation of P#(E) for generic fixed f(E) for the
two stages game When f(E) is not a sum of δ functions,
the computation is done in an iterative way. Considering
f(E) fixed (or slowly evolving, this can be done in a wide
range of the parameters), we call ft(E) the varying effec-
tive distribution, changing in time because agents go to a
+ or − status. Starting from values at t− 1, we compute
values at t in this way:
1. ft(E) = f(E)P
#
t−1(E) +
P0
P
δ−(E − 1);
2. we convolve ft to obtain the probability density of the
energy of the projects at time t, fPt (E) =
∫ 1
0
ft(E
′)ft(E−
E′)dE′;
3. we obtain Ets as the value such that
∫ Et
s
0
fPt dE
′ = P0
P
;
4. at last, we compute P#t (E) = P
#
t−1(E)
∫ 1
Es−E ft(E
′)dE′)+
(1 − P#t−1(E))
∫ 1
Es−1 ft(E
′)dE′.
This procedure allows to compute numerically P#(E).
A stable function, in very good agreement with simula-
tions, is obtained after around 10 iterations. In Fig. 2 we
used 80 iterations.
Once P#(E) is found, it is easy to compute π(E) con-
sidering all possible combinations of + and −.

